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Abstract
Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargain-
ing model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in
initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collec-
tive bargaining situations we can say which of the two (two-dimensional) power
constellations is better and thereby derive the power structure endogenously. By
distinguishing various measures of (evolutionary or reproductive) success we can
identify the forces shaping the relative power indices of trade unions.
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1 Introduction
The literature of collective (but also individual) wage bargaining has been inspired by the
cooperative solution of Nash (1950, 1953). The so-called Nash-bargaining solution does
not require transferable utility (like the so-called TU-games) and can be justi¯ed both
axiomatically and by a non-cooperative representation (the so-called (Nash-)demand
game) together with an ad hoc but nevertheless very in°uential idea of equilibrium se-
lection (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, and GÄuth and Kalkofen, 1989). Of all e±cient
agreements the Nash-bargaining solution picks the one for which the product of agree-
ments dividends (what the parties get in addition to their con°ict payo®s) is maximal.
One crucial aspect of the Nash-bargaining solution is its symmetry axiom. Since
in most bargaining situations one observes strategic (dis)advantages of one party, this
has seriously restricted its predictive success (early experimental tests of the Nash-
bargaining solution are Kalisch, Milnor, Nash, and Nering, 1954, Nydegger and Owen,
1975, and Roth and Malouf, 1979). One therefore (see, for instance, Roth, 1979) has
generalized the concept by maximizing the product of weighted agreement dividends.
The non-negative exponents (the weights) add up to one and measure the power of the
respective bargaining parties.1
A further generalization is due to Manning (1987). His basic idea is that relative
bargaining power (as measured by the exponents of agreement dividends) may depend
on the issue when (collective) bargaining has to specify at least two di®erent issues, e.g.
the (wage) tari® and the employment level. His sequential bargaining model assumes
that parties (the trade union and its counterpart) ¯rst determine the wage level and
then the employment level where bargaining power of the two parties on the ¯rst and
second stage may be di®erent. Actually extreme asymmetries like these are typically
assumed in (micro) economics. So sellers, e.g. monopolists, usually have dictatorial
power concerning sales prices whereas customers can dictate how much they order.
A consequence of Manning 1987's generalization is that each pair of power indices in
the unit sqare represents a di®erent bargaining model. This large variety can be viewed
as a chance when trying to achieve a better ¯t in econometric applications but also as a
dilemma since hardly anything can be concluded for the result without knowing the two
power indices. Our approach tries to resolve this dilemma by not imposing exogenously
power indices but by deriving them endogenously. More speci¯cally, we will derive just
one evolutionarily stable constellation of power indices in the unit square where the
result may, of course, depend on the speci¯cation of the evolutionary model.
Methodologically our approach is one of indirect evolution. In indirect evolution one
does not model directly the evolution of behavior but of its underlying (institutional)
determinants like, for instance, preferences (see GÄuth and Kliemt, 1998, for a conceptual
1There are various axiomatic and procedural, i. e. non-cooperative justi¯cations of Nash's bargaining
solution which help to understand more thoroughly ist vasic aspects. Here we do not want to discuss
this since our main approach is to analyze the evolution of bargaining power in wage and employment
bargaining.
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discussion). For the case at hand collective bargaining is determined by the two power
indices, as suggested by Manning (1987). The power constellation may, however, change
over time in view of past success. One may, for instance, switch to other constellations
yielding a larger surplus. This, of course, implies a model of evolutionary selection which
we provide by linking two parallel collective bargaining situations. By distinguishing
several evolutionary models we can point out what determines each of the two power
indices in the model of Manning (1987).
The following section describes the fundamental set up, the special model of Manning
(1987, section IV). We then link two parallel bargaining situations what allows us to
compare the (evolutionary or reproductive) success of one power constellation with
another. Section 4 studies the evolution of two-dimensional bargaining power for the
(a±ne) speci¯cation of this linkage whereas section 5 is devoted to the homogeneous
but non-linear case. In our Conclusions we summarize and discuss our results.
2 The basic model
Although this is more questionable when collective wage bargaining is more (above the
¯rm level) centralized, a party's bargaining power may depend on the issue, i.e. on the
aspect which is to be negotiated like the size of the labour force or the wage tari®s. In
collective bargaining at the ¯rm level it may depend on the alternative jobs of employees
whether the union is relatively strong or weak when negotiating how large the labour
force should be. Similarly, the excess of status quo { wages over social bene¯ts and the
(disutility of) work stress can be decisive for union's strength when bargaining about
wage tari®s. In this sense of independent bargaining power for wages and employment
Manning (1987) has generalized collective wage bargaining where he assumes that items
(wages, respectively employment levels) are negotiated sequentially (see Manning, 1987,
section I, for some earlier models which qualify as special cases of his general model).
We only introduce the special model2 of Manning (1987, section IV). The ¯rm and
the trade union negotiate both,
² the wage level w and
² the size L of the labour force.
Payo®s depend on the these two variables as follows:
¦(w; L) = f(L) ¡ w ¢ L (1)
is the ¯rm's pro¯t resulting from total production f(L), depending positively on L,
minus labour cost w ¢L. Let b (¸ 0) denote employees' aspiration level below which they
would refuse to work, e.g. by organizing so-called wild strikes and thereby threatening
2The general version allows for more general payo® and production functions.
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the (relevance of the) trade union. Manning (1987, p. 128) refers to b as \the level of
utility available to union members elsewhere". The trade union is both interested in a
high excess wage (w ¡ b) and in a large labour force L. Its simple payo® function is
U(w; L) = (w ¡ b) ¢ L: (2)
An important aspect of our study is to show
² how the level b can be endogenously determined by considering parallel collective
negotiations, e.g. for other ¯rms, branches, regions, and
² how this in°uences which bargaining strength one has to expect in the long run.
Parties (the ¯rm management and the trade union)
² ¯rst select w by maximizing
U(w; L)p ¢ ¦(w; L)1¡p or plnU(w; L) + (1 ¡ p)ln¦(w; L) (3)
with p 2 [0; 1] measuring the union's bargaining power in wage bargaining and
² then determine L via maximizing
U(w; L)q ¢ ¦(w; L)1¡q or qlnU(w; L) + (1 ¡ q)ln¦(w; L) (4)
for given w where now q 2 [0; 1] is the union's bargaining strength when negotiating
the employment level L at a given wage w.
For the speci¯c production function
f(L) = L¯ with 0 < ¯ < 1 (5)




¢ ¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)p





(¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)p): (7)
By variation of p and q one can represent special cases in the collective bargaining
literature, e.g.
² p = q (e±cient bargaining; MacDonald and Solow, 1981),
² p = 1 = 1 ¡ q (union monopoly; Dunlop, 1944, and Oswald, 1982),
² p 2 (0; 1), q = 0 (\right to manage-models"; Nickell, 1982).
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3 Parallel collective negotiations
Collective negotiations do not occur in isolation but parallel with similar negotiations
in other ¯rms, branches, and/or regions with might in°uence each other mutually. Es-
pecially \the level of utility available to union members elsewhere" (Manning, 1987, p.
128) will usually and strongly depend on what happens in other collective negotiations
(for earlier attempts to capture such dependencies see GÄuth, 1978). Let us refer by
i = 1; 2 as the two3 parallel collective negotiations whose payo®s are ¦i(wi; Li) and
Ui(wi; Li), respectively, and whose bargaining strengths are given by
pi; qi 2 [0; 1] for i = 1; 2: (8)
The outside option levels bi are assumed to be interrelated in the form4 of
bi = c + dwj for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j (9)
with c > 0 and 0 < d < ¯p
2¯2+3¡4¯
. Inserting (9) into the equation (7) for wi yields





[¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)pi] and ±i =
d
¯
[¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)pi]: (11)




for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j: (12)
Now °i and ±i depend on pi and °j and ±j on pj so that wi depends on both, pi and pj ,
what justi¯es our shorthand
wi = wi(pi; pj) for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j (13)
for the two equations (12). Notice that due to 0 < ¯ < 1, p1; p2 2 [0; 1], c > 0, and the












3Since we want to apply evolutionary ideas when endogenizing the outside option level b, the number
2 re°ects the usual number of interacting individuals in evolutionary biology or game theory. It is here
assumed for simpli¯cation and no restriction of our general approach.
4By using the same parameters c, d, and ® we preserve the usual symmetry assumption in evolu-
tionary biology and game theory. Allowing for i-speci¯c parameters would mean to decide between
one or two population-interpretation, respectively evolutionary analysis. One could try to justify the
speci¯cation of job search in case of con°ict in bargaining. A simpler interpretation would view c as
determined by unemployment bene¯ts and d by how close the work skills, required in both ¯rms are.
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°i; ±i > 0 for i = 1; 2 (15)
what implies
wi(pi; pj) > 0 for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j: (16)
The solution wages are always well-de¯ned. Inserting them into (9) determines
the two outside option levels b1 and b2 which in turn allow to compute the employment
levels L1 and L2 with the help of equation (6). Thus we have accomplished our ¯rst task,
namely to endogenize the outside option level(s) by introducing interrelated collective
labor negotiations. The second challenge to derive the bargaining strength parameters
pi and qi instead of assuming them exogenously is what we tackle in the next section.
4 On the evolution of bargaining power
Compared to the simple set up of Manning's speci¯c model (Manning, 1987, section
IV) we so far have only endognized the outside option or minimum aspiration levels b1
and b2 by linking them to the agreed upon wage in the parallel labor negotiations. This
establishes the only structural relationship between the two ongoing labor negotiations5.
We do not only want to endogenize these minimum wage requirements b1 and b2
but also the power parameters p1; p2; q1; q2 2 [0; 1]. If these can assume all possible
constellations (due to the linked negotiations this is now even more dimensional than in
case of the Manning-model), hardly anything speci¯c, e.g. regarding e±ciency, can be
claimed. Let us therefore try to somewhat reduce this large variety of possible power
structures as represented by the vectors (p1; q1;p2; q2) 2 [0; 1]4. In doing so we rely on
the indirect evolutionary approach which allows to derive the rules of the game instead
of imposing them.
An evolutionary game ¡ = (M ; R(¢)) is de¯ned by
² the strategy/mutant set M which here is given by the set
(p; q) 2 M = [0; 1]2 = [0; 1] £ [0; 1] (17)
of union's power parameters p and q and by
² the ¯tness/success function
R((p; q); (ep; eq)) (18)
measuring for all (ep; eq)-monomorphic populations how a strategy/mutant (p; q)
would fare in such an environment.
5If the ¯rms interact on the same product market, one would have to include an additional structural
relationship which is neglected here.
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What R((p; q); (ep; eq)) essentially measures is the tendency of changing the power
structure in the sense that for
R((p; q); (ep; eq)) > R((ep; eq); (ep; eq)) (19)
the power parameters (p; q) will more likely evolve (the processes which can trigger
such adaptation will be discussed in the Discussion below). If there exists some vector
(p¤; q¤) 2 M such that
R((p¤; q¤); (p¤; q¤)) > R((p; q); (p¤; q¤)) (20)
for all (p; q) 2 M with (p; q) 6= (p¤; q¤) we will say that the power structure (p¤; q¤) is
evolutionarily stable.
It remains to de¯ne the ¯tness/success function R(¢) for the model at hand. Instead
of imposing one speci¯c function R(¢) we consider several reasonable candidates like
(i) R((p1; q1); (p2; q2)) = w1(p1; p2);
(ii) R((p1; q1); (p2; q2)) = (L1(p1; q1; p2; q2))¯;
(iii) R((p1; q1); (p2; q2)) = w1(p1; p2) ¢ L1(p1; q1; p2; q2); or
(iv) R((p1; q1); (p2; q2)) = w1(p1;p2)¢L1(p1;q1;p2;q2)(L1(p1;q1;p2;q2))¯ :
In case (i) the basic assumption is that trade unions tend to move to power structures
yielding higher wages. This makes sense if the power structure (p; q) is mainly resulting
from trade union's investments in bargaining strength. A similar justi¯cation can be
given for cases (iii) and (iv) where trade union's power structure is induced by the total
wage bill, respectively by the wage share. Case (ii), where success is measured by the
production amount, allows for a less biased in°uence on the power structure. Here the
idea is that the power structure is e±ciency enhanced so that both parties could pro¯t
from its adaptation.




for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j (21)
as the (evolutionary or reproductive) success measure. Since wi(¢) does not depend at
all on the power indices qi and qj, all power indices
q(¤)i 2 [0; 1] for i = 1; 2 (22)




¯2(¯ ¡ 1)c[¯(d(pj ¡ 1) ¡ 1) ¡ dp2]




p¤i = 1 for i = 1; 2: (24)
For the other speci¯cations (ii), (iii), and (iv) an analytic result is (in our view, pro-
hibitively) more di±cult. We therefore rely on the numerical plots in Figures 1, 2, and
3 for these three speci¯cations whose clearcut results are as follows:6
½
p¤i = 0; q¤i = 1 for i = 1; 2 and cases (ii) and (iii)
p¤i = 1; q¤i = 1 for i = 1; 2 and case (iv):
(25)
Figure 1: Success measure (ii) with p2 = 0:5; c = 0:1; d = 0:5; and ¯ = 0:9
6Our numerical results are robust for di®ering parameter constellations.
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Figure 2: Success measure (iii) with p2 = 0:5; c = 0:1; d = 0:5; and ¯ = 0:9
Figure 3: Success measure (iv) with p2 = 0:5; c = 0:1; d = 0:5; and ¯ = 0:9
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Before discussing such results we want to confront them with those where the mathe-
matical form of the mutual dependency of collective labor negotiations is quite di®erent.
5 Non-linear interdependencies of outside option lev-
els
If one assumes
bi = w®j with 0 < ® < 1 for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j; (26)
instead of (9) the wages depend on the power indices p1 and p2 as follows:7
wi = kiw®j for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j (27)
where
ki =
¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)pi
¯
for i = 1; 2: (28)
According to (26) the outside option levels bi become 0 when wages in the other nego-
tiations converge to 0. This implies rather speci¯c results:
Proposition 1 The evolutionarily stable power con¯guration (p¤i ; q¤i ) for i = 1; 2 must
satisfy p¤i = 1; q¤i 2 [0; 1] for case (i);
p¤i = 0; q¤i = 1 for case (ii), and
p¤i = 0; q¤i = 1 for cases (iii) and (iv):
Proof. We prove the result for case (i); for the other cases the corresponding results








(®2 ¡ 1)(¯(p1 ¡ 1) ¡ p1)
: (29)
With the help of
A1 = ¯(p1 ¡ 1) ¡ p1; (30)




A3 = ¯ ¡ 1; and (32)
7A formula comprising both cases, the linear interdependency (9) and the non-linear one in (26),
would be bi = ci +diw®i : It would mean that (9) relies on ® = 1 and (26) on ci = 0 and di = 1 and that
we neglect other possibilities like, for instance, ci = 0 for ® = 1 for which the result is with w1 = w2 = 0
trivial. In our view, the a±ne linear speci¯cation (9) and the homogeneous non-linear one in (26) are
the more natural assumptions how outside option wages are interrelated.
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A4 = ®2 ¡ 1 (33)












From ®; ¯ 2 (0; 1) follows





what proves that only constellation (p¤; q¤) with p¤ = 1 can be evolutionarily stable.
Since w1 does not depend on q1 or q2 there is no evolutionary adaptation of q, the trade
union's power in employment negotiations. This is di®erent for the more comprehensive
success measures (ii), (iii), or (iv) where one obtains p¤i = 0 and q¤i = 1; for proof see
Appendix. ¥
Thus the non-linear interdependency (26) of outside option values bi will soon or later
lead to a so-called \union monopoly" (see Dunlop, 1944, and Oswald, 1982) with p¤i = 1
if the power structure is purely wage guided whereas the opposite result is obtained for
the more comprehensive success measures.
6 Discussion
Our results are conveniently summarized by Table 1 which lists for i = 1; 2 the evolu-
tionarily stable power constellations (p¤i ; q¤i ) for both types (\a±ne" or (9), \non-linear"
or (26)) of linking the two parallel bargaining situations as well as for all four measures
of (evolutionary or reproductive) success. By q(¤)i it is indicated that such levels are only
weakly stable. The two linkage types yield the same results when success is measured
by the achieved wage level wi (case (i)), by rational product (case (ii)), and by the
total wage bill wiLi (case (iii)). For the remaining case the result di®ers: Whereas for
the a±ne linkage it gets all the power in initial wage bargaining, the non-linear link-
age makes it powerless in wage bargaining. Both linkages assign all the power in later
employment bargaining to trade unions.
Table 1 illustrates that the stable power constellation can depend on both, the success
measure and on the type of linkage. This may be seen as bad or good news:
² The bad news would be that we wanted to narrow down the wide spectrum of
power constellations ((p1; q1); (p2; q2)) 2 [0; 1]4: Although the results are mostly
unique, they vary partly with the speci¯cation of success, respectively the type of
linkage. Thus there are still (too?) many possibilities.
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type of success measure
linkage (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
a±ne p¤i = 1, q
(¤)
i 2 [0; 1] p¤i = 0, q¤i = 1 p¤i = 0, q¤i = 1 p¤i = 1, q¤i = 1
non-linear p¤i = 1, q
(¤)
i 2 [0; 1] p¤i = 0, q¤i = 1 p¤i = 0, q¤i = 1 p¤i = 0, q¤i = 1
Table 1: The evolutionarily stable power parameters p¤i and q¤i for the a±ne and the
non-linear linkage as well as for all 4 success measures
² A more opportunistic interpretation of our results would claim that we observe
di®erent power constellations in the real world and that our general approach ap-
parently can account for this fact. Especially it may be simply a fact of life that
the linkage of two collective labor negotiations is sometimes a±ne and sometimes
non-linear. Similarly, the success measure guiding the adaptation of the power
constellation may vary: Unions, for instance, may primarily care for wages (most
likely the less centralized collective bargaining is) but may also be socially re-
sponsible (in case of national trade unions) as suggested by the success measure
(ii).
² Although the stable power constellation can change with the linkage type and
the speci¯cation of success, Table 1 also displays quite some robustness. The
result (p¤i ; q¤i ) = (0; 1), for instance, can be justi¯ed by any combination of success
measures (ii) and (iii) with linkage types (and also by success measure (iv) for the
non-linear linkage).
If a power constellation (pi; qi) is better than (pj ; qj), where \better" is de¯ned by one
of the 4 di®erent success measures, why and how can the j-trade union (or both parties
if the success measure suggests this) adapt a power constellation nearer to (pi; qi)? That
such adaptation takes place rests on two assumptions, namely
² that power parameters can change over time
² in ways indicated by superior success.
The ¯rst assumption seems hardly restrictive. The strength of trade unions is in-
°uenced by many factors like their participation rates (which percentage of the labor
force is unionized), the general employment situation etc. which are changing over time.
Let us therefore concentrate on the latter assumption above. Here the justi¯cation will
strongly depend on the success measure.
If the wage level is the measure of success the change of union power should result
from power speci¯c investments by trade unions. If, for instance, (pi; qi) yields higher
wages than (pj; qj) since trade union i has a higher participation rate than union j,
the latter will (re)direct its activities to increase its own participation rate. Similar
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arguments should apply in case of the total wage bill or of the wage quota as success
measure.
For the social output (case (ii)) as the measure of success) the adaptation of the
power constellation over time could rely on investments by both parties or result from
public opinion changes. In a society where capital assets are widely dispersed even the
employer side might not object to power structures inspiring a larger social output.
If in another region the social surplus is much higher, public opinion will support all
attempts to imitate the example of the other region. This would be especially obvious
when public opinion directly in°uences the power constellation in the sense that trade
unions are only strong when their policy is publicly supported.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
For the success measure (ii) we get
Y1 = (L1(p1; q1; p2))¯ = [
w1(p1; p2)®
¯
¢ ¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)p1









































and thus q¤1 = 1:
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For the success measure (iii) or
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implies @LS1@q1 > 0 and thus q
¤
1 = 1:
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so that q¤1 = 1: ¥
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